Abstract. We introduce natural strategic games on graphs, which capture the idea of coordination in a local setting. We show that these games have an exact potential and have strong equilibria when the graph is a pseudoforest. We also exhibit some other classes of graphs for which a strong equilibrium exists. However, in general strong equilibria do not need to exist. Further, we study the (strong) price of stability and anarchy. Finally, we consider the problems of computing strong equilibria and of determining whether a joint strategy is a strong equilibrium.
Introduction
In game theory coordination games are used to model situations in which players are rewarded for agreeing on a common strategy, e.g., by deciding on a common technological or societal standard. In this paper we introduce and study a very simple class of coordination games, which we call coordination games on graphs:
We are given a finite (undirected) graph the nodes of which correspond to the players of the game. Each player chooses a colour from a set of colours available to her. The payoff of a player is the number of neighbours who choose the same colour.
their payoffs by coordinating their choices in groups (also called coalitions). In our studies we therefore focus on equilibrium concepts that are resilient to deviations of groups; more specifically we study strong equilibria [5] and k-equilibria of coordination games on graphs. Recall that in a strong equilibrium no coalition of players can profitably deviate in the sense that every player of the coalition strictly improves her payoff. Similarly, in a k-equilibrium with k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where n is the number of players, no coalition of players of size at most k can profitably deviate.
Our contributions. The focus of this paper is on the existence, inefficiency and computability of strong equilibria and k-equilibria of coordination games on graphs. Our main contributions are as follows:
1. Existence. We show that k-equilibria for k ≥ 5 do not exist in general. On the other hand, 2-equilibria and Nash equilibria always exist. Similarly, strong equilibria exist if there are only two colours available.
Further, we identify several graph structural properties that guarantee the existence of strong equilibria. For example, strong equilibria are guaranteed to exist if the underlying graph is a pseudoforest 4 . Also, they exist if the graph is colour complete, i.e., if for each available colour x the components of the subgraph induced by the nodes having colour x are complete.
In all our proofs the existence of strong equilibria (resp. k-equilibria) is established by showing a stronger result, namely that the game has the coalitional finite improvement property, i.e., every sequence of profitable joint deviations is finite (see Section 2 for a formal definition).
Inefficiency.
We also study the inefficiency of equilibria. In our context, the social welfare of a joint strategy is defined as the sum of the payoffs of all players. The k-price of anarchy [1] (resp. k-price of stability) refers to the ratio between the social welfare of an optimal outcome and the minimum (resp. maximum) social welfare of a k-equilibrium.
We show that the price of anarchy is unbounded, independently of the underlying graph structure, and the strong price of anarchy is 2. In general, for the k-price of anarchy with k ∈ {2, . . . , n−1} we derive almost matching lower and upper bounds of 2 n−1 k−1 −1 and 2 n−1 k−1 , respectively. We also provide conditions on the graph guaranteeing that the strong price of stability is 1.
Our results thus show that as the coalition size k increases, the worst-case inefficiency of k-equilibria decreases from ∞ to 2. In particular, we obtain a constant k-price of anarchy for k = Ω(n).
First, coordination games on graphs are polymatrix games. Recall that a polymatrix game (see [19, 21] ) is a finite strategic game in which the payoff for each player is the sum of the payoffs obtained from the individual games the player plays with each other player separately. Hoefer [17] studied clustering games that are also polymatrix games based on graphs. Each player plays one of two possible base games depending on whether the opponent is a neighbour in the given graph or not. However, in this setup each player has the same set of strategies, so the resulting games are not comparable with ours. Cai and Daskalakis [12] consider a special class of polymatrix games which they call coordination-only polymatrix games. These games are identical to coordination games on graphs with edge weights. They show that pure Nash equilibria exist and that finding one is PLS-complete. The proof of the latter result crucially exploits that the edge weights can be negative. Note that negative edge weights can be used to enforce that players anti-coordinate. Our coordination games do not exhibit this characteristic and are therefore quite different from theirs.
Second, our coordination games are related to additively separable hedonic games (ASHG) [9, 11] , which were originally proposed in a cooperative game theory setting. Here the players are the nodes of an edge weighted graph and form coalitions. The payoff of a node is defined as the total weight of all edges to neighbours that are in the same coalition. If the edge weights are symmetric, the corresponding ASHG is said to be symmetric. Recently, a lot of work focuses on computational issues of these games (see, e.g., [7, 8, 15] ). Aziz and Brandl [6] study the existence of strong equilibria in these games. The PLS-hardness result in [15] does not carry over to our coordination games because it makes use of negative edge weights, which we do not allow in our model. Note also that in ASHGs every player can choose to enter every coalition which is not necessarily the case in our coordination games. Such restrictions can be imposed by the use of negative edge weights (see also [15] ) and our coordination games therefore constitute a special case of symmetric ASHGs with arbitrary edge weights.
Third, our coordination games on graphs are related to congestion games [25] . In particular, they are isomorphic to a special case of congestion games with weakly decreasing cost functions (assuming that each player wants to minimize her cost). Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [26] derive a structural characterization of strategy sets that ensure the existence of strong equilibria in such games. By applying their characterization to our (transformed) games one obtains that strong equilibria exist if the underlying graph of the coordination game is a matching or complete (both results follow trivially from our studies). Bilò et al. [10] study congestion games where the players are embedded in a (possibly directed) influence graph (describing how the players delay each other). They study the existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in these games. However, because the delay functions are assumed to be linearly increasing in the number of players, these games do not cover the games we study here.
Further, coordination games on graphs are special cases of the social network games introduced and analyzed in [4] (if one uses in them thresholds equal to 0). These are games associated with a threshold model of a social network introduced in [2] which is based on weighted graphs with thresholds.
Strategic games which involve colouring of vertices of a graph have also been studied in the context of the vertex colouring problem. These games are motivated by the question of finding the chromatic number of a graph. As in our games, the players are nodes in a graph that choose colours. However, the payoff function differs from the one we consider here: it is 0 if a neighbor chooses the same colour and it is the number of nodes that chose the same colour otherwise. Panagopoulou and Spirakis [24] show that an efficient local search algorithm can be used to compute a good vertex colouring. Escoffier, Gourvès and Monnot [14] extend this work by analyzing socially optimal outcomes and strong equilibria. Chatzigiannakis et al. [13] studied the vertex colouring problem in a distributed setting and showed that under certain restrictions a good colouring can be reached in polynomial time.
Finally, coordination games on graphs are examples of games on networks, a vast research area recently surveyed in [20] .
In spite of these close connections, our coordination games on graphs are different from all classes of games mentioned above. Notably, this is due to the fact that our games combine the three properties mentioned above, i.e., join the crowd, asymmetric strategy sets and local dependencies modeled by means of an undirected graph.
Our techniques. Most of our existence results are derived through the application of one technical key lemma. This lemma relates the change in social welfare caused by a profitable deviation of a coalition to the size of a minimum feedback edge set of the subgraph induced by the coalition 5 . This lemma holds for arbitrary graphs and provides a tight bound on the maximum decrease in social welfare caused by profitable deviations. Using it, we prove our existence results by means of a generalized ordinal potential function argument. In particular, this enables us to show that every sequence of profitable joint deviations is finite. Further, we use the generalized ordinal potential function to prove that the strong price of anarchy is 1 and that strong equilibria can be computed efficiently for certain graph classes.
The upper bound on the k-price of anarchy is derived through a combinatorial argument. We first fix an arbitrary coalition of size k and relate the social welfare of a k-equilibrium to the social welfare of an optimum within this coalition. We then extrapolate this bound by summing over all coalitions of size at most k. We believe that this approach might also prove useful to analyze the k-price of anarchy in other contexts.
Preliminaries
A strategic game G := (N, (S i ) i∈N , (p i ) i∈N ) consists of a set N := {1, . . . , n} of n > 1 players and a non-empty set S i of strategies and a payoff function p i : [5] is an n-equilibrium.
Given a joint strategy s, we call the sum SW(s) = i∈N p i (s) the social welfare of s. When the social welfare of s is maximal we call s a social optimum. Given a finite game that has a k-equilibrium its k-price of anarchy (resp. stability) is the ratio SW(s)/SW(s ′ ), where s is a social optimum and s ′ is a k-equilibrium with the lowest (resp. highest) social welfare. In the case of division by zero, we interpret the outcomes as ∞. The (strong) price of anarchy refers to the k-price of anarchy with k = 1 (k = n). The (strong) price of stability is defined analogously.
A coalitional improvement path, in short a c-improvement path, is a maximal sequence (s 1 , s 2 , . . . ) of joint strategies such that for every k > 1 there is a coalition K such that s k is a profitable deviation of the players in K from s k−1 . Clearly, if a c-improvement path is finite, its last element is a strong equilibrium. We say that G has the finite cimprovement property (c-FIP) if every c-improvement path is finite. So if G has the c-FIP, then it has a strong equilibrium. Further, we say that the function P : S → A, where A is a set, is a generalized ordinal c-potential, also called generalized strong potential [16, 18] , for G if for some strict partial ordering (P(S ), ≻) the fact that s ′ is a profitable deviation of the players in some coalition from s implies that P(s ′ ) ≻ P(s). It is easy to see that if a finite game admits a generalized ordinal c-potential then the game has the c-FIP. The converse also holds: a finite game that has the c-FIP admits a generalized ordinal c-potential. The latter fact is folklore; we give a self-contained proof in Appendix A.
Note that in the definition of a profitable deviation of a coalition, we insisted that all members of the coalition change their strategies. This requirement is irrelevant for the definitions of the k-equilibrium and the c-FIP, but it makes some arguments slightly simpler.
Coordination games on graphs
We now introduce the games we are interested in. Throughout the paper, we fix a finite set of colours M of size m, an undirected graph G = (V, E) without self-loops, and a colour assignment A. The latter is a function that assigns to each node i a non-empty set
Let N i denote the set of all neighbours of node i. We define a strategic game G(G, A) as follows:
-the players are identified with the nodes, i.e., N = V, -the set of strategies of player i is
So each node simultaneously chooses a colour from the set available to her and the payoff to the node is the number of neighbours who chose the same colour. We call these games coordination games on graphs, from now on just coordination games. Example 1. Consider the graph and the colour assignment depicted in Figure 1 . Take the joint strategy that consists of the underlined strategies. Then the payoffs are as follows: -1 for the nodes 1, 6, 7, -2 for the nodes 2, 3, -3 for the nodes 4, 5, 8.
It is easy to see that the above joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. However, it is not a strong equilibrium because the coalition K = {1, 4, 5, 6, 7} can profitably deviate by choosing colour c.
⊓ ⊔
We now recall some notation and introduce some terminology. Let G = (V, E) be a graph. Given a set of nodes K, we denote by G[K] the subgraph of G induced by K and by E[K] the set of edges in E that have both endpoints in K.
Further, δ(K) denotes the set of edges one vertex of which is in K and the other outside of K. Also, given a subgraph C of G we use V(C) and E(C) to refer to the set of nodes and the set of edges of C, respectively.
Furthermore, we define SW K (s) := i∈K p i (s). Given a joint strategy s we denote by E + s the set of edges {i, j} ∈ E such that s i = s j . We call these edges unicolour in s. (In Figure 1 , these are the bold edges.) Note that SW(s) = 2|E + s |. Finally, we call a subgraph unicolour in s if all its nodes have the same colour in s.
Existence of strong equilibria
We begin by studying the existence of strong equilibria and k-equilibria of coordination games. We first prove our key lemma and then show how it can be applied to derive several existence results.
Key lemma
Recall that an edge set F ⊆ E is a feedback edge set of the graph G = (V, E) if the graph (V, E \ F) is acyclic.
Lemma 1 (Key lemma). Suppose s
Proof. Let N K denote the set of neighbours of nodes in K that are not in K. Abbreviate SW(s ′ ) − SW(s) to ∆SW, and analogously use ∆SW L for a coalition L. The change in the social welfare can be written as
We have
It follows that
Furthermore, the payoff of the players that are neither in K nor in N K does not change and hence ∆SW V\(K∪N K ) = 0. Putting these observations together, we obtain
(1)
We know that (K, F c ) is a forest because F is a feedback edge set. So |F c | < |K|. Hence
Furthermore, each player in K improves his payoff when switching to s ′ and hence ∆SW K ≥ |K|. So, plugging in these inequalities in (1) we get
Lemma 1 then yields that SW(
The following example shows that this bound is tight.
Example 2.
We define a graph G = (V, E) and a colour assignment as follows. Consider a clique on l nodes and let K be the set of nodes. Every i ∈ K can choose between two colours {c i , x}, where c i c j for every j i. Further, every node i ∈ K is adjacent to (l − 2) additional nodes of degree one, each of which has the colour set {c i }. Note that when defining a joint strategies s if is sufficient to specify s i for every i ∈ K because the remaining nodes have only one colour to chosse from.
Let s := (c i ) i∈K and s ′ := (x) i∈K . Then s K →s ′ is a profitable deviation because every node in K increases its payoff from (l − 2) to (l − 1). Also
Furthermore, each tree on |K| nodes has |K| − 1 edges. Thus
Tightness follows because the left hand side is always even. ⊓ ⊔
Application 1: colour forests and pseudoforests
We use our key lemma to show that coordination games on pseudoforests admit strong equilibria. Recall that a pseudoforest is a graph in which every connected component contains at most one cycle. For a colour x ∈ M let 
This is a feedback edge set satisfying Using it we now establish the following result.
Theorem 2. Every coordination game on a pseudoforest has the c-FIP.
Proof. Associate with each joint strategy s the pair
We now claim that P : S → R 2 is a generalized ordinal c-potential when we take for the strict partial ordering ≻ on P(S ) the lexicographic ordering.
Consider a profitable deviation s K →s ′ . By partitioning K into the subsets of different connected components we can decompose this deviation into a sequence of profitable deviations such that each deviating coalition induces a subgraph of a connected graph with at most one cycle. By Corollary 2 the social welfare in each of these profitable deviations weakly increases.
, then by Corollary 1 each of these profitable deviations is by a coalition that induces a connected graph with exactly one cycle. Moreover, this cycle becomes unicolour in s ′ . Thus P(s ′ ) ≻ P(s).
⊓ ⊔
Further applications
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Corollary 1. We next derive an existence result of k-equilibria in graphs with edge-disjoint cycles. We call an edge e of a graph private if it belongs to a cycle and is node-disjoint from all other cycles.
Lemma 2. Let G be a graph with edge-disjoint cycles. Then there exists a private edge.
Proof. First we show that there is a cycle C with the following property: There is at most one node in V(C) reachable from cycles other than C without traversing edges in E(C). Assume that the claim does not hold. Then G contains at least two cycles and each cycle C has at least two nodes v 1 C , v 2 C that are reachable from other cycles. By starting at one cycle C, traversing these two nodes, going on to the next reachable cycle and repeating this process, it is possible to construct a path P. This process has to stop at some point and so a subset of P has to be a cycle. This cycle is not edge-disjoint with at least two cycles we traversed; a contradiction. Now, let C be as in the claim above and assume that v is the only node in V(C) reachable from a cycle other than C (if no such node exists, any edge in E(C) is private). Then any edge e such that v is not an endpoint of e is private.
⊓ ⊔ 
By Lemma 2, there is a cycle C with a private edge e = {u 1 , u 2 } ∈ E(C). We claim that C = C i for at most one i. Assume otherwise and let i 1 , i 2 such that C = C i 1 = C i 2 and C C i for i 1 < i < i 2 . Because C = C i 1 , e is unicolour in s i 1 +1 . We know that C is the only cycle containing u j for j = 1, 2 by choice of e. So u j K i for i 1 < i < i 2 and hence e is still unicolour in i 2 . But C switches from completely non-unicolour in s i 2 to unicolour in s i 2 +1 , a contradiction.
Since C is the only cycle containing u j for j = 1, 2, it follows that each u j can appear at most once in a deviating coalition. So there is an index l such that u 1 , u 2 K i for all i > l. Hence if we remove e and call the new graph G ′ , then for all i > l, s i
→s i+1 is a profitable deviation in G ′ . Because G ′ has one cycle less than G, we can apply the induction hypothesis and conclude that the considered sequence of profitable deviations is finite. ⊓ ⊔
Uniform coordination games
Next, we establish the c-FIP property for some additional classes of coordination games. We call a coordination game on a graph G uniform if for every joint strategy s and for every edge {i, j} ∈ E it holds: if s i = s j then p i (s) = p j (s).
Theorem 4. Every uniform coordination game has the c-FIP.
Proof. Given a sequence θ ∈ R n of reals we denote by θ * its reordering from the largest to the smallest element. Associate with each joint strategy s the sequence (p 1 (s) , . . . , p n (s)) * that we abbreviate to p * (s). We now claim that p * : S → R n is a generalized ordinal cpotential when we take for the partial ordering ≻ on p * (S ) the lexicographic ordering on the sequences of reals. Suppose that some coalition K profitably deviates from the joint strategy s to
Assume this does not hold. Rename the players such that p * (s ′ ) = (p 1 (s ′ ), . . . , p n (s ′ )). Let i be the smallest value for which p i (s ′ ) < p i (s). By assumption such an i exists. By the choice of i for all j < i we have p j (s ′ ) ≥ p j (s) and also 
Corollary 5. Every coordination game on a colour complete graph has the c-FIP. In particular, every coordination game on a complete graph has the c-FIP.
The existence of strong equilibria for colour complete graphs also follows from a result by Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [26] and the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Coordination games on colour complete graphs are a special case of monotone increasing congestion games in which all strategies are singletons.
Proof. We can assume without loss of generality that for each colour x, G[V x ] is connected (otherwise, we replace x with a new respective colour for each component of G[V x ]). Then we can identify x with a singleton resource, the payoff function of which
so the payoff in the coordination game coincides with the payoff in the associated congestion game.
⊓ ⊔ Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz [26] show that monotone increasing congestion games in which all strategies are singletons admit strong equilibria. Note, however, that our result above is stronger because we show that these games have the c-FIP.
Non-existence of strong equilibria in general graphs
The coordination game discussed in Example 1 shows that strong equilibria do not exist in general.
Theorem 5. There is a coordination game that does not admit a strong equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the coordination game discussed in Example 1 (see Figure 1) . We prove that it does not admit a strong equilibrium. For the sake of a contradiction, assume that s is a strong equilibrium of this game.
Consider players 4 and 5. Let i, j ∈ {4, 5}, i j be such that p i (s) ≤ p j (s). Note that the neighbours of i and j (excluding j and i, respectively) are the same. As a consequence, for players 1, 6, and 7 we have s 1 = s 6 = s 7 = a as otherwise any such player could profitably deviate by choosing a. Thus, the only remaining possible configuration for s is the one indicted in Figure 1 (by the underlined strategies). But this is not a strong equilibrium because the coalition K = {1, 4, 5, 6, 7} can profitably deviate by choosing colour c. This yields a contradiction and concludes the proof.
⊓ ⊔
Note that in the above proof we used deviating coalitions of size at most 5, i.e., we showed that 5-equilibria do not need to exist. In contrast, the considered joint strategy s is a k-equilibrium for all k ≤ 4. It would be interesting to determine whether 3-equilibria and 4-equilibria always exist.
The above example can be adapted to show that there are coordination games that do not have the c-FIP but are c-weakly acyclic. Recall that a game G is c-weakly acyclic if for every joint strategy there exists a finite c-improvement path that starts at it. Note that a c-weakly acyclic game admits a strong equilibrium.
Corollary 6. There is a coordination game that does not have the c-FIP but is c-weakly acyclic.
Proof. Take the coordination game from Example 1 and modify it by adding to each colour set a new, common colour d. Then the joint strategy s in which each player selects d is a strong equilibrium. Moreover, for each player her payoff in s is strictly higher than in any joint strategy in which she chooses another colour. So s can be reached from each joint strategy in just one profitable deviation, by a coalition of the players who all switch to d. On the other hand, the argument presented in Example 1 shows that this game does not have the c-FIP.
Inefficiency of k-equilibria
We first summarize some results concerning the strong price of stability of coordination games.
Theorem 6. The strong price of stability is 1 in each of the following cases:
-G is a pseudoforest; -G is a colour forest; -there are only two colours.
Proof. If G is a pseudoforest, a maximum of P in the lexicographic ordering defined in the proof of Theorem 2 is a strong equilibrium and a social optimum. In the other two cases, the social welfare function SW is a generalized ordinal c-potential. So in both cases each social optimum is a strong equilibrium.
⊓ ⊔
We next study the k-price of anarchy of our coordination games. It is easy to see that the price of anarchy is unbounded.
Theorem 7. The price of anarchy of coordination games is unbounded, independently of the graph structure.
Proof. Let G = (V, E) be an arbitrary graph. We assign to each node i ∈ V a colour set A i = {x i , c}, where x i is a private colour, i.e., x i x j for every j i, and c is a common colour. The joint strategy s in which every player chooses her private colour constitutes a Nash equilibrium with SW(s) = 0. On the other hand, the joint strategy s ′ in which every player chooses the common colour c is a social optimum with SW(s ′ ) = 2|E|.
⊓ ⊔
We now determine the k-price of anarchy and the strong price of anarchy. We define for every j ∈ N and K ⊆ N and joint strategy s,
Intuitively, this is the payoff j derives from players in K.
Theorem 8. The k-price of anarchy of coordination games is between 2
n−1
for every k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Further, the strong price of anarchy is exactly 2.
Proof. We first prove the upper bound. By the definition of the payoff function for all joint strategies s and σ, we have N K j (σ) ≤ p j (σ K , s −K ). Suppose that the considered game has a k-equilibrium, say s, and let σ be a social optimum. By the definition of a k-equilibrium, for all coalitions K of size at most k there exists some j ∈ K such that p j (σ K , s −K ) ≤ p j (s) and hence by the above N K j (σ) ≤ p j (s). Fix a coalition K = {v 1 , . . . , v k } of size k. We know that there is some j ∈ K such that N K j (σ) ≤ p j (s). Rename the nodes so that j = v k . Further, there is a node j such that
Again we rename the nodes so that j = v k−1 . Continuing this way we obtain that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} it holds that N
Summing over all players in K we obtain
Hence rewriting (1) yields
It also holds that
which implies that
Now we sum over all coalitions K of size k. Each player i appears in n−1 k−1 of such sets because it is possible to choose k − 1 out of n − 1 remaining players to form a set K of size k that contains i. Hence, letting K vary over all coalitions of size k we get
and the same for the joint strategy s. Furthermore, for each edge e = {u, v} ∈ E + σ , we can choose 2 n−2 k−1 sets K of size k such that e ∈ δ(K). Indeed, assuming that u ∈ K and v K, we can choose k − 1 out of n − 2 remaining players to complete K and hence there exist 
By summing over all coalitions K of size k, equation (2) yields
It follows that the k-price of anarchy is at most
This concludes the proof of the upper bound. The claimed lower bounds follow from Examples 3 and 4 given below.
⊓ ⊔
The following example establishes a lower bound on the k-price of anarchy.
Example 3. Fix n and k ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Let V(G) consist of two sets V 1 and V 2 of size k and n − k, respectively, and define
Fix three colours a, b and c.
Then the colour assignment σ in which each player chooses the common colour c is a social optimum. The social welfare is
Next we show that the colour assignment s in which every node in V 1 chooses a and every node in V 2 chooses b is a k-equilibrium. Assume that there is a profitable Note that SW(s) = k(k − 1). It follows that the k-price of anarchy is at least
The following example shows that the upper bound of 2 on the strong price of anarchy (k = n) of Theorem 8 is tight.
Example 4.
Consider the graph and the colour assignment depicted in Figure 2 . Here  (a, a, a, a) is a social optimum with the social welfare 8, while (b, b, b, a) is a strong equilibrium with the lowest social welfare, 4. So the strong price of anarchy is 2 in this example of 4 players. By duplicating the graph l times, we can draw the same conclusion for the case of 4l players.
Complexity
In this section we study complexity issues concerning k-equilibria. 
Verification
First, we show that in general it is hard to decide whether a given joint strategy is a k-equilibrium.
Let k-Equilibrium denote the problem to decide whether, given a coordination game with a joint strategy s and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, s is a k-equilibrium.
Theorem 9. k-Equilibrium is co-NP-complete.
Proof. It is easy to verify that k-Equilibrium is in co-NP: a certificate of a NO-instance is a profitable deviation of a coalition of size at most k.
We show the hardness by reduction of the complement of Clique, which is a co-NP-complete problem. Let (G, k) be an instance thereof. We construct an instance of k-Equilibrium as follows. For v ∈ V let A v = {x v , y}, where the colours x v are pairwise distinct. Furthermore, for every node v ∈ V we add k − 2 nodes u 1 v , . . . , u k−2 v and edges {v, u i v } for i = 1, . . . , k − 2. These additional nodes can only choose the colour x v . Let s be the joint strategy in which every node v ∈ V chooses x v . We claim that this is a k-equilibrium if and only if G has no clique of size k.
Suppose G has a clique K of size k. Then jointly deviating to y yields to each node in K a payoff of k − 1, whereas every node has a payoff of k − 2 in s. So this is a profitable deviation. For the other direction, suppose that there is a profitable deviation s K →s ′ by a coalition K of size at most k. Then every node in K deviates to y and hence belongs to V. Since every node in K has a payoff of k -U(v) is a connected coalition K ⊆ T v of minimum size such that v ∈ K and the deviation to (x K , s −K ) is profitable for all nodes in K (if such a coalition exists). We denote the properties it has to satisfy by ( * ).
We denote the properties it has to satisfy by ( * * ). (Note that the deviation is not required to be profitable for
We can compute D, D p , U and U p using a dynamic program as follows. Let v ∈ V x and suppose we found these objects for all children of v.
if such a set exists. In this case set U(v) = {v} ∪ U p (U) and D(v) = |U(v)|. Otherwise, we set it to ∞. We first prove that K := U(v) satisfies ( * ) if U(v) exists. K is connected because v ∈ K and all sets U p (u) are connected, for u ∈ C v . It is profitable for v to deviate to x because of (3). The deviation is profitable for nodes u ∈ K \ {v} because U p (u) ⊆ K, P(u) ∈ K (by the connectivity of K) and U p (u) satisfies ( * * ). Furthermore, K is of minimal size amongst all coalitions that satisfy ( * ). Indeed, if K ′ is another such coalition, then U ′ := K ∩ C v satisfies (3) because it is profitable to deviate to x for v. It is profitable for u ∈ U ′ to deviate to x and hence
if such a set exists. In this case set 
≤ k is the coalition we are looking for. ⊓ ⊔
Computing strong equilibria
Next we focus on the problem of actually computing a strong equilibrium. As we show below, this is possible for certain graph classes. Proof. We first show that for a tree a strong equilibrium can be computed efficiently via dynamic programming. By Corollary 1 it suffices to compute a social optimum. Let T be a tree and root it at an arbitrary node r ∈ V(T ). Given a node i ∈ V(T ), let T i denote the subtree of T that is rooted at i and let C i be the set of children of i. 
The intuition here is that we account for every child j ∈ C i of i for the maximum social welfare achievable in T j plus an additional contribution of 2 if i and j choose the same colour.
where m is the number of colours. Thus, it takes time O(m 2 |V(T )|) to compute all values d r (s r ) for s r ∈ S r of the root node r. The optimal social welfare of the tree T is then SW(T ) = max s r ∈S r d r (s r ). The corresponding optimal joint strategy s * T can be determined using some standard bookkeeping.
Next suppose that T is a pseudotree. Let C = (i 1 , . . . , i k ) be the unique cycle in T . Note that it might no longer be sufficient to simply compute a social optimum for T . Instead, the idea is to compute a social optimum s * T of T such that, if possible, C is unicoloured.
Note that if such a social optimum does not exist, then there is an edge in C that is not unicoloured. Let SW( j), j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, be the maximum social welfare of the tree that one obtains from T by removing edge {i j , i j+1 } from C (where we define i k+1 = i 1 ). Note that we can efficiently compute SW( j) by using the dynamic program for trees described above. 6 Let SW 1 = max j=1,...,k SW( j). Computing SW 1 takes time O(k · m 2 |V(T )|) = O(nm 2 |V(T )|).
Next assume a social optimum exists in which all nodes of C are unicoloured. Note that if we remove the edges on C from T then T decomposes into k trees, rooted at i 1 , . . . , i k . We can compute d i j (·) for every root i j as described above. Let R = ∩ k j=1 S i j be the set of common colours of the nodes in C. If all nodes in C choose colour c ∈ R then we obtain a social welfare of
Let SW 2 = max c∈R SW(c). The time needed to compute SW 2 is at most O(m 2 |V(T )|+k·m).
Clearly, if SW 1 > SW 2 then there is no social optimum in which all nodes of C have the same colour. In this case, we choose an arbitrary social optimum. Otherwise, there exists a social optimum in which all nodes of C have a common colour. In this case, we choose such a social optimum. Let the resulting social optimum for pseudotree T be s * T . By proceedings this way for each pseudotree T of the given pseudoforest G, we obtain a joint strategy s * that maximizes the social welfare and the number of unicolour cycles. By Corollary 2, s * is a strong equilibrium of G. The time needed per pseudotree T is dominated by O(nm 2 |V(T )|). The total time needed to compute s * is thus at most O(n 2 m 2 ). ⊓ ⊔
Conclusions
We introduced and studied a natural class of games which we termed coordination games on graphs. We provided results on the existence, inefficiency and computation of strong equilibria for these games. An intriguing open question is whether k-equilibria exist in these games for k = 3, 4. Recall that they are guaranteed to exist for k ≤ 2 (Corollary 3) and may not exist for k ≥ 5 (Theorem 5). Also it would be interesting to prove existence of k-equilibria for other graph classes and to investigate the computational complexity of computing them. Another open question is to determine the (strong) price of anarchy when the number of colours is fixed.
A natural generalization of our model are coordination games on weighted graphs. Here each edge {i, j} has a non-negative weight w i j specifying how much player i and j profit from choosing the same colour. It is easy to see that 1 2 SW continues to be an exact potential function for weighted coordination games, guaranteeing the existence of Nash equilibrium. (In fact, as observed in [12] , this is an exact potential for coordination games with arbitrary weights.) However, preliminary investigations show that the existence results for strong equilibria (Theorems 1 and 2) and 2-equilibria (Corollary 3) do not hold. We leave the more detailed study of these weighted coordination games for future work.
In the future we also plan to study a natural extension to the games based on hypergraphs.
A c-FIP and generalized ordinal c-potentials Theorem 13. A finite game has the c-FIP iff a generalized ordinal c-potential for it exists.
Proof. (⇒) We use here the argument given in the proof of [23] of the fact that every finite game that has the FIP (finite improvement property) has a generalized ordinal potential.
Consider a branching tree the root of which has all joint strategies as successors, the non-root elements of which are joint strategies, and whose branches are the cimprovement paths. Because the game is finite this tree is finitely branching.
König's Lemma of [22] states that any finitely branching tree is either finite or it has an infinite path. So by the assumption the considered tree is finite. Hence the number of c-improvement paths is finite. Given a joint strategy s define P(s) to be the number of prefixes of the c-improvement paths that terminate in s. Then P is a generalized ordinal c-potential, where we use the strict linear ordering on the natural numbers.
(⇐) Immediate, as already noted in [18] . ⊓ ⊔
